Introduction
In this chapter, we use a macropolitics approach to study a century of Congressional policymaking for telecommunications. We attempt to explain the production of major laws -their timing and volume -in the area of telecommunications policy. Our real subject, however, is the creation and operation of regulatory regimes. Therefore, we view the chapter not only as an experiment in macropolitics but also one in policy history or "American Political Development" (APD).
Let us stake out more clearly the terrain over which we maneuver. Why is the production of major laws interesting? From a substantive viewpoint, Congress's enactments of the Radio Act of 1912, the Communications Act of 1934, and the Telecommunications and Deregulation Act of 1995, along with many lesser statutes, were the creation of the American state in this policy arena-though hardly the whole story, of course. And, Congress's willingness or reluctance to allow its creations, especially the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), to make decisions ranging from the mundane to the momentous, has been a central feature of the operation of this regulatory regime. In our view, understanding when and why Congress creates regulatory regimes, and how it manages them, is crucial for understanding the history of the American state.
Explaining the timing and volume of Congressional action is a daunting task. 1 Vast literatures attempt to explicate the logic of congressional policymaking. Some "theories" -e.g., so-called garbage can models -try to make a virtue of the difficulties, elevating the apparent randomness of the process into its central feature (Kingdon) . In contrast, we show that simple and largely intuitive notions from rational choice institutionalism afford at least some purchase on the historical data. Briefly, we argue that a necessary condition for lawmaking is a degree of ideological congruence between the key oversight committees in the House and Senate. But ideological congruence is not enough: there must be a positive reason for Congress to involve itself in this technically difficult area, rather than rely on agents in the Executive to manage affairs. Ideological estrangement between the executive agent and the congressional overseers creates such an impetus. If a period of ideological congruence across the chambers coincides with a period of estrangement from the executive agency, the stage is set for a surge of legislation.
This extremely simple framework affords genuine purchase on the data, but there are severe limits on the traction afforded by such extremely decontextualized concepts. In our view, a new kind of history of the administrative state -one that is theoretically driven yet also sensitive to the internal logic of regulatory regimes -demands to be written. This new kind of political history has yet to find its Gibbon or Namier. But when it does, the ideas we explore may prove useful -at least, that is our hope.
An issue that deserves a brief word is the scale of the analysis, the "forest vs. the trees" issue. Most of the previous work on the production of important legislation has operated at a highly macro level, aggregating across all policy arenas over a relatively brief period (the post-war era). 2 These studies try to map the forest as a whole. However, by operating at such a high level of aggregation, they can address only the grossest political features, e.g., whether one party controlled both houses of Congress and the presidency. 3 Conversely, most policy histories operate at a very micro level, emphasizing the fine grain of policymaking within circumscribed policy arenas. These studies don't just examine the trees -they scrutinize individual leaves! We seek a middle ground, focusing on a single policy arena but examining the broad sweep of legislative activity within it. By operating at this mid-range, we can obtain much longer time series and employ more finely articulated theories of Congressional policymaking than most "macro" studies. At the same time, we can provide a more coherent picture of policymaking than ultra-fine-grained policy histories. But these advantages come at a cost. We give up the ability to say anything about the forest as a whole, nor can we address the shape of the leaves on specific trees. Readers can judge the costs and benefits of this tradeoff for themselves.
The chapter is organized in the following way. Section 2 sets the stage by presenting a highly schematic history of federal telecommunications policy. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework, and discusses its plausibility in this policy arena. Section 4 explains how we measure key variables and presents some basic information about them. Section 5 undertakes an empirical analysis of the data. Section 6 concludes. An Appendix presents data.
History of Telecommunications Policy

Early Formation of Regulatory Regime
Though historical accounts of the regulation of telecommunications often begin with the 1934 Communications Act, which established the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), state and federal regulation of telephone, telegraphy, and radio preceded this historic enactment. From 1900 to 1917, there was rapid expansion of state regulation of telephone and broadcasting (Cohen, 1991) . 4 The earliest regulatory laws were based on existing railroad or public utility commissions (PUCs) for telephone and telegraph service and commercial licensing for radio. Federal regulatory attention began with the Radio Acts of 1910 and 1912 which put broadcast industries under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Commerce, and the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 which gave the Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction over telephone and telegraph industries.
Demand for regulatory intervention into the telephone industry came from at least three sources: 1) the public, who increasingly viewed the service as a necessity, a public utility that everyone should have; 2) the public nuisance caused by the technological issues of multiple telephone wires; and 3) industry who felt battered by the competitive pressures of the open marketplace. Early competition among telephone providers had led to absurd and dangerous conditions in many American cities, as the streets were clogged with hundreds of separate telephone wires strung from every building. Only a single wire is needed to transmit calls, but the wires themselves were proprietary to each telephone company. Since it is socially and economically inefficient to have more than one set of wires by which to transmit telephone messages, experts, policymakers, and industry leaders began to refer to telephone service as a "natural monopoly." These arguments helped gain support for state and federal laws that would protect the companies, like AT&T (nee Bell Telephone), that had invested private capital to build the nation's telephone infrastructure.
In exchange for this market position, AT&T made a commitment to providing fair and equitable telephone service. 5 The Mann-Elkins Act had very little, if any, opposition from industry. "On the contrary, AT&T supported, even advocated, regulation as a legal sanction for monopoly," reports Robinson, with CEO Vail arguing that regulation was needed to protect both carriers and public.
If there is to be state control and regulation, there should also be state protection-protection to a corporation striving to serve the whole community…from aggressive competition which covers only that part which is profitable. (Robinson, 1989: 7) Even independent telephone companies, battered from the competitive pressures of the better-financed Bell Company, believed that regulation would bring the accompanied protections of market-entry control and price stabilization (Brock, 1981) .
Despite the established regulatory regime, the ICC did not aggressively implement the Mann-Elkins mandate and rarely invoked its given powers. The agency concentrated more on their original charge to oversee railroad and transportation-related commerce cases. Only a handful of telephone regulation cases were brought before the ICC during its tenure over the area (Cohen, 1991; Robinson, 1989) . The most important aspect of ICC regulation was to enforce a uniform system of accounting from telephone companies and to require periodic reports from AT&T as part of an ICC-mandated review for reasonableness of rates (Cohen, 1991) . Later, these documents would provide a foundation for regulation and antitrust cases brought by the Justice Department in the following decades.
Mann-Elkins did not provide the ICC any authority over acquisitions and mergers. AT&T very aggressively took advantage of this lack of legal restraint and set out to purchase many of its competitors, until the Justice Department was able to halt these practices with the Kingsbury Commitment in 1913. This agreement, though, was overturned with the Willis-Graham Act of 1921, which gave merger oversight power to the ICC. Since the ICC was equally lax in enforcing this power as their other regulatory duties, AT&T responded by resuming its aggressive purchasing strategy (Cohen, 1991 (Wollenberg, 1989: 66) .
Congress enacted the Radio Act of 1927, which created the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) to act as a regulatory agent in the provision of licenses and other oversight of the new industry. The Act defined the power of government to regulate use of radio frequencies in the public interest. The guiding directive of the FRC's regulatory functions was "to uphold the public interest, convenience and necessity" as it related to radio broadcasting. As early as 1923, federal officials voiced the opinion that radio was essentially a public service that carried special responsibilities from broadcasters (Robinson, 1989) . In the language of the time, the "public airwaves" were a natural resource which were essentially "borrowed" by broadcasters. Radio regulation occurred due to radio's natural scarcity of available broadcasting frequencies as well as a sense that the device could be used to protect or impinge on public safety. The 1927 Act codified these ideas. The fledgling industry generally accepted the public service obligation, and as such, nationalization of radio was never considered seriously in Congress or any other branch.
To prevent AT&T from dominating the new field of radio broadcasting, Congress explicitly divided the field into distinct niches with the Radio Act of 1927. The legislation made key distinctions based on the technical differences in these industries: telephone and telegraph-related wire or hardware would be regulated, while the content of communications via radio or other broadcast medium would not be.
The Radio Act of 1927 was not meant to be a comprehensive solution to the regulation of the radio industry. It was enacted as a temporary measure with only a one-year life span. The initial task of the FRC was to clean up the chaos caused by the Zenith decision, but it actually took several years for it to accomplish this (Wollenberg, 1989) .
(Congress subsequently extended its charter beyond the first year.) The FRC was charged with developing an orderly system to allocate and oversee license distribution, which they would then turn over to the Secretary of Commerce. The original intent was that the FRC's regulatory power would eventually revert to the Department of Commerce, and the FRC would be continued as an independent quasi-judicial tribunal to oversee conflicts and revoke licenses. Nevertheless, when the FRC did not develop the system in time, the arrangement set down in 1927 proved permanent.
New Deal, New Regime: The Communications Act of 1934
The Communications Act of 1934 established the FCC as the federal agency with sole authority to regulate telecommunications and the broadcast industry with a vague mandate "to protect the public interest, convenience, and necessity." The essential structure and powers of the FRC were adopted as a permanent solution to regulate the industries of telephony and broadcasting. Some legal historians deride the creation of the FCC from the FRC as little more than a one letter name change (Robinson, 1989 ). (Robinson, 1989) ). In retrospect, experts have ascribed the primary motive for establishing the FCC to the claim that the previous structures, oversight by the ICC and the FRC, were not sufficient. The ICC, in short, was too busy with railroad and other transportation-related commerce to pay much attention to telecommunications and the FRC was too slow in adopting a new licensing system. The status quo regulatory powers were not considered deficient, only unused. The explanation is somewhat unsatisfying given the broad delegation of authority and does not account for the timing of the enactment. Could sheer politics-namely that Franklin D. Roosevelt wished to remove Hoover appointees and replace them with his ownprovide a better explanation?
Regime Status Quo (1934-late 1950s)
Even though the new agency claimed no new federal powers, the establishment of the FCC itself did prove to be a significant change. There was now an attentive expert panel, if not exactly a watchdog, which took seriously the role of regulating these industries in the name of the public interest. Over the next half-century, the ebb and flow of FCC control would be related to court challenges and decisions, anti-trust legislation of Congress (Cantor and Cantor, 1986) , and technological and economic changes in the industry of telecommunications. Though FCC regulations became the norm for defining federal regulations in telecommunications, the Justice Department was also involved in policing AT&T in regard to the antitrust implications of its monopoly. The threat of antitrust rulings from the judicial branch remained throughout the twentieth century even as other branches of government supported the AT&T monopoly model.
World War II and the boom-period afterward was an important time in the development of telecommunications. Through the Defense Department, there was extensive public support for private research and development of telecommunications tools, including microwave communications, computer systems and satellite technologies (Cantor and Cantor, 1986) . In terms of congressional activity, though, the status quo was unchallenged; there was a long lull in Congressional lawmaking on telecommunications in the 1940s and 1950s. This was due, at least in part, to the broad support enjoyed by AT&T and the pro-business stance of President Eisenhower, who on several occasions called the AT&T monopoly, a "national resource" (Rosentiehl, 1997) .
Pushing the Envelope: Technological and Political Shifts (late 1950s-1960s)
Still technological advances pushed the status quo points even if political concerns did not. New technologies of microwave and satellite communications, as well as cable television and the broad acceptance of network television were all developed in the late 1950s. 6 The FCC claimed jurisdiction over these new industries, and was largely unquestioned in doing so, even though the 1934 Act did not expressly support it (Robinson, 1989) . Another development was the waning of the previously monolithic support for market leader industries in telephone and traditional broadcasting, both in the FCC and Congress. (The Justice Department had never been strongly aligned with industry.)
Though AT&T and national network broadcasters still had great regulatory advantages, several policy decisions from the FCC, Congress and the Department of Justice signaled changes in political support. First, the 1959 FCC ruling, known as the Above 890 Decision (a reference to the frequency threshold of microwaves), allowed private licensing of microwave technology and mandated free interconnection with the existing telephone system (Zarkin, 1998) . This allowed MCI, the first major competitor to AT&T in over three decades, to offer enhanced telephone services, ushering in the potential for competition. 7 Second, Congress enacted several laws that promoted "nonnetwork" television by supporting community television stations, by requiring all television sets to have capacity for UHF and VHF channels, and by creating and funding educational television and radio via the Public Broadcasting Service. Third, the Justice Department negotiated the Consent Decree of 1956 that broke up the AT&T's monopoly over the manufacture of telephone equipment (Rosenstiehl, 1997 
Regulatory Framework in Flux: the 1970s, leading to the 1982 Breakup of AT&T
In the 1970s, there was a renewed interest in reforming telecommunications policy more broadly. Founded in part on the technological advances of the 1960s, policy experts, 9 regulators and legislators no longer unanimously held state-sanctioned monopolies in telecommunications to be in the public interest. Demands for regulatory change came from consumer advocates, who were concerned about telephone rates in a time of rising inflation (Crandall and Waverman, 1995) , start-up industries that wanted to enter markets untapped, but controlled by AT&T, and the Department of Justice.
Within Congress, committee reforms of 1974 had created specific House and Senate subcommittees for communications policy and increased the number of research staff available to legislators in this policy area (Rosenstiehl, 1997) . To many legislators, (the Chair of the House Subcommittee, in particular) competition and deregulation were now seen as more in the public interest than the preservation of the AT&T monopoly, in contrast to the policies of previous decades. Nonetheless, very little congressional legislation was passed to enact this change in philosophy. While the FCC took steps to increase competition in various sectors of the broadcast and telephone industries, Congress chose inaction on several competing telecommunications bills. A pro-AT&T bill reaffirming the 1934 Communications Act was introduced in 1976, with support of the Department of Defense, state utility regulators, and two large unions. Yet, the Subcommittee chair refused to accept arguments that emerging competition should be halted. Several bills to introduce competition were introduced in late 1970s (HR 13015, HR3333, HR 6121), but all died, facing strong AT&T opposition. One 1980 bill failed because of Judiciary Committee opposition in light of the impending result from the Department of Justice and AT&T lawsuit.
The Department of Justice (DoJ) and the federal courts were more aggressive in their efforts to open telephone markets to competition. The centerpiece of the judicial branch approach was the anti-trust case brought against the AT&T in 1974. The result eight years later was the break-up of the AT&T monopoly into subsidiary firms. In 1982, AT&T settled with the Department of Justice signing the Modified Final Judgement (MFJ) agreement, which broke AT&T up into eight large firms. In the agreement, AT&T divested from its local telephone companies (which became known as the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) or more informally the Baby Bells). AT&T was allowed to retain the long distance, manufacturing and data processing components of its business. The Baby Bells were granted a local telephone service monopoly, but could not enter the industries allocated to AT&T. The rationale of the suit was firmly in the usual style of telecommunications regulation, dividing each technological niche into its own sphere and banning any cross-ownership.
During the years of the Justice Department lawsuit, Congress had consistently been considering bills to increase competition in telephone, signaling that AT&T's core support there was eroding. The FCC, as demonstrated by their expert testimony to Congress during this time and various technical reports that were issued, also began to oppose AT&T's complete monopoly (Rosenstiehl, 1997) . Even earlier than this, the settlement of a private suit with MCI (MCI v. FCC, D.C. Cir., 1977) forced AT&T into open competition in long-distance service. Still, the Department of Justice solution to AT&T's hold on the market was a radical departure from existing policy, prompting some in Congress to challenge the DOJ authority (Rosenstiehl, 1997) . Public opinion about the break-up was decidedly mixed, and policy historians agree that there was never a public outcry against AT&T's monopoly status to prompt the drastic action (Hudson, 1997; Crandall and Waverman, 1995) . The aftermath of the AT&T breakup left Congress and the FCC in new regulatory terrain.
The break-up of AT&T, in some ways, mirrors a technological paradox that the regulatory regime had created. Since the 1920s, a "divide-and-conquer" strategy of cross-ownership bans were used to keep market leaders of a technological area in check. AT&T, for instance, was not allowed to own or distribute messages via cable television systems, although it has been possible since the 1950s. Technological convergence of cable, fiber optics, and computer communications in the 1990s have undercut the regulatory positions. The FCC, aware of these developments, began to issue reports to reconsider the cross-ownership ban approach (Zarkin, 1998) . Through the 1980s and 1990s, the FCC has taken actions that departed from its traditional efforts to separate industries into different regulatory niches. It promoted policies that would take advantage of the integrated technologies of telephones, video telephones, cable TV, and computers (Zarkin, 1998) .
A New Regime? The Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1996
The Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1996 (referred to as the Telecommunications Act of 1996) represents a comprehensive reworking of the regulatory regime in telecommunications. Demand for increased competition in the telecommunications industry and other regulatory changes came from several angles.
First, the Clinton Administration, led especially by Vice President Al Gore, placed modernization of the U.S. telecommunications infrastructure as a high priority on their agenda. Dubbed the National Information Infrastructure (NII) initiative, the Administration sought public financing for special projects as well as reforms to spur private industry activity through competition and grant making.
Second, telecommunications and the information industries had become a large and highly visible part of the U.S. economy, estimates ranging from 10 to 20 percent of total (Congressional Quarterly, 1995) . Local telephone business was the single largest segment of this market (approximately $98 billion in 1994), with long-distance service second (accounting for $65 billion), and cable TV operations a distant third ($23 billion). Computer and Internet-related communications and commerce, though a relatively small share, was one of the fastest growing segments of the economy, with some estimates of its use and valuation rising more than 200% a year since 1995. 10 In this climate, both start-up industries and educated consumers were advocating for regulatory maneuverability so as to market more advanced high-tech products and services.
Third, in the absence of Congressional action, the courts, FCC regulators, and the states were removing regulatory barriers to competition, but in a piecemeal fashion (Congressional Quarterly, 1995: 4-4) . Federal courts had ruled that Congress improperly blocked telephone companies from entering the cable industry, and the Supreme Court was reviewing this case in late 1995. The FCC was also "pro-reform." For instance, the agency had been devising ways to encourage local Bells to experiment with videophone services and other non-telephone services and had been promoting open competition in the Internet for the past several years.
Last, but not least, several members of Congress had been crafting legislation that would promote increased competition in the telecommunications. Both the House and the Senate of the 103 rd Congress considered several other telecommunications bills that would have gradually removed regulatory barriers to competition, but those bills were never reported out of committee. In the 104 th Congress, the historic and sweeping reform law was passed in the first session.
Enacted by a Republican Congress, and supported by the Clinton Administration, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 affected every segment of the telecommunications industry: telephone, cable TV, broadcasting, and computer communications. The primary mechanism of deregulation in this Act was to reverse the long-standing policy of placing regulatory barriers between each of the niches in the telecommunications industry. In the past, long-distance telephone was separated from local telephone service (via the 1982 MFJ), cable TV was divided from telephone (via FCC policy and the teleco-cable ban of 1974), and telephone companies were prohibited from offering enhanced services (Congressional Quarterly, 1995) , to name a few restrictions.
Once, technological barriers separated these industries, and natural monopoly arguments were used to establish a protectionist monopoly system. Over the years, especially with advancements in digital technology and computers, these barriers no longer existed. Some reformers argued that this regulatory scheme had become technologically and economically irrational. They argued that open competition would decrease prices, promote innovation, such as the video telephone, and offer consumers 10 The Internet has been called the fastest growing technology ever. Though unknown to most people a decade ago, the FCC now estimates that one-third of the nation's households regularly use the Internet and the "Internet Economy" generated over $300 billion in revenue. (Oxman, FCC Working Paper No. 31, 1999) the added value of integrated communications solutions. Critics of the legislation countered that removing regulatory safeguards would undermine the universal service goals of telephone and spur the development of huge communications and broadcasting conglomerates, which would eventually control prices and content in the marketplace.
Rather than reducing the need for the FCC, the new legislation has provided a new charter and a raft of regulatory questions to address. The FCC is still the primary federal interpreter of telecommunications regulations and the chief agency in charge of the law's smooth and consistent implementation. The FCC, for instance, has to "grant permission" in order for a previous monopolist to enter a new field. Plus, the agency was given new roles in order to assure that competition would not adversely affect the public interest. Specifically, the FCC was ordered to convene federal-state boards to assure the maintenance of low-cost telephone service (universal service) and to oversee that no state or local regulations preempted the federal law to open competition (Congressional Quarterly, 1995) . The Telecommunications Act of 1996 also mandated that when state and federal policy conflict, the FCC will determine which policy better serves the national interest. Previously, the FCC only held power over interstate telecommunications matters, such as national broadcast standards and long distance telephony, with state bodies overseeing local TV rules and local telephone service.
Historically, telecommunications regulation has always favored private sector ownership and control of the industry, from the government's explicit support of the AT&T monopoly in the early twentieth century to the FCC's support of mergers and acquisitions that have scaled back the impact of the AT&T break-up in the 1990s. 11 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 continues this tradition. As in 1934, private ownership in 1996 was justified as the best means to serve consumers. But now, competition rather than the protection of a "natural monopoly" is advanced as the better means to advance technological innovation, improve services, and lower costs. How well this will work in practice remains uncertain.
The Politics of Telecommunications Policy
A Theoretical Framework
The theoretical ideas we employ have become common currency among rational choice institutionalists, though no one has implemented them exactly this way before (at least to the best of our knowledge). In essence, we combine standard ideas from the spatial theory of policy bargaining, with standard ideas from the theory of political delegation, to explain surges and slumps in legislative productivity.
In simplest form, the spatial theory of bargaining can be illustrated via Figure 0 . 12 The line in the figure is a one-dimensional policy space, a convenient way to represent many policies. The points marked H and S represent the "ideal points" of two actors, e.g., the chairmen of the House and Senate Commerce committees. These points indicate the most preferred policies of the two chairmen. We assume the value to a chair of other policies declines proportionately with distance from her ideal point.
The interval between the two ideal points is known as the pareto set, and it plays an important role in the analysis. Note that, for any given point outside the pareto set, one can find a point within the pareto set that both chairs prefer. On the other hand, given a point within the pareto set, it is impossible to find a point that both prefer. Suppose the two chairs bargain about changing policies, with either free to propose any change she wishes. But suppose further that both chairs must agree on the change if it is to occur (as the rules of Congress assure). Then it seems reasonable to believe that, over time, the two chairs will replace policies outside the pareto set with ones inside them. But once a point has entered the pareto set, it will be invulnerable to further change.
This exceedingly simple setup affords one way to think about "policy windows." For policies outside the pareto set, the "policy window" is open. For policies inside the pareto set, it is closed. Suppose that new "policies" arrive randomly throughout the policy space, as new problems arise within a dynamic, industrial society. If the ideal points of the two players are close, then the pareto set is small and the "policy window" for the new problems is apt to be open. But if the ideal points of the two players are far apart, then the new policy may well lie within the pareto set -the policy window is apt to be closed. Thus, simple notions of bargaining suggest that ideological agreement between the House and Senate chairmen of relevant committees is apt to be necessary for much legislative action.
In the modern administrative state, Congress directly manages few areas. More typically, it delegates authority to an agent in the executive. In the last few years, political scientists have devoted a great deal of thought to the dynamics of delegation. 13 Again, we will employ only a sketch of these interesting ideas. In Figure 0 , suppose that an agency has an ideal point outside the pareto set. It would seem that the agency must set policy within the pareto set to avoid triggering congressional reversal of its policy. However, information costs or other transaction costs for the chairmen may give the agency a degree of "wriggle room." If so, the chairmen may be reluctant to delegate to an agency whose ideal point lies far outside the pareto set, as this agency will face strong incentive to exploit the "wriggle room" and bend policy in its favor. Thus, when the agency is ideologically distant, the chairs may find it more attractive to direct policy themselves. Hence, more legislation. Somewhat similarly, if an agency lies outside the pareto set, attempts to "cheat" on policy, but is found out by the chairs, then the two chairs will be able to agree on remedial legislation altering the policy of the agency. Both arguments suggest that legislation is apt to be more frequent as the agency lies further outside the pareto set. And both arguments suggest that the key distance is from the agency's ideal point to the nearer of the two committees, since it is the willingness to act of the "more friendly" of the two chairs that is the real constraint on legislating.
Where is the President in this picture? At one level, the president is another veto player. But perhaps even more crucially, he is an administrative one as well. If the president shares the ideology of the key congressional actors, then his appointments to the agency will bring it closer to the preferred ideological stance of the congressional overseers. In addition, if the president has any direct administrative authority, he may use it to eliminate the agency's ideological "cheating" or "wriggling," if he shares the ideology of the chairs. In either case, ideological conformity between the chief executive officer of the administrative state and key legislative actors is apt to decrease direct legislative intervention in policy making, at least in areas where Congress prefers to delegate than legislate directly. 14 Epstein and O'Halloran provide evidence that this is apt to be more likely in technologically difficult areas, like telecommunications. 15 In sum, these simple ideas suggest that legislation is more likely to be possible if the two chairs are ideological soul mates. But even so, the possibility will produce real legislation only if the two chairs have a positive incentive to act. In an area in which Congress prefers to delegate policy making, an impetus to action is more likely if the relevant agency is ideologically estranged from the chairs, and if the president is ideologically untrustworthy as well.
Congress and the FCC
Are these ideas at all plausible in this policy arena? The history of the relationship between the FCC and Congress strongly supports a principal-agent dynamic. In the first place, the FCC is not a "darling" agency, but one that has often been browbeat by Congress (Ember (1971), Krasnow and Longley (1973) Most of our work is done with congressional committees. We concentrate on Congress. We firmly believe that the FCC will do whatever Congress tells it to do, and will not do anything Congress tells it not to do. (Krasnow and Longley, 1973: 56) This is not to say that organizations, especially large firms and industry organizations, do not lobby the FCC directly. They do. Indeed, a recent study by de Figueiredo and Tiller (2000) analyzed over 900 lobbying contacts between industry and the FCC, covering over 100 issues, and occurring in just the early portion of 1998. 16 The evidence suggests that industry lobbyists seek to influence policy decisions at both ends, the FCC and Congress.
It is important to note that telecommunications policy, and the FCC, is also influenced by the Judiciary and the Justice Department, both of which have been active in oversight since the early days of telephone and radio regulation, predating the Communications Act of 1934. The threat of judicial review shapes FCC rulemaking, above and beyond just the cases brought into court. (The existence of the FCC itself, since it involves broad delegation of Congress, has been under court challenge.) As Shapiro (1988) and others have noted, every decision and administrative rule is subject to question, thus affecting how those laws are drawn in the original. In addition, the judicial branch is not always in step with Congress, adding another layer of complexity to the political environment that the FCC must maneuver.
Caveats aside, the FCC has substantive policymaking authority and makes many of the rules and regulations that affect the telecommunications field. Its jurisdiction and administrative capacity far exceed the original mandate of the Communications Act of 1934 (Paglin, 1989) . Nonetheless, the Commission fulfills its mandate to be information gathering for Congress and to deliberate on broad policy matters related to preserving public interest of telecommunications. Over its history, the FCC has sometimes taken a far-reaching and activist role, but it remains, ultimately, tethered to Congress and the executive.
Measurement
In this section, we discuss how we measure the key variables, and provide some basic information about them.
The Laws and Legislative Productivity
We use a broad definition of telecommunications policy and include legislation related to broadcasting (radio, television, cable television) and communication devices (telegraph, telephone, wireless and Internet/computer) that have been widely used in the twentieth century. Laws were identified by reading through lists of laws in the Statues at Large (1900 Large ( -1944 Kahn (1968) , Paglin (1989) , Brock (1981) , Cohen (1991 ), Rosentiehl (1997 , Zarkin (1998) , Cantor and Canter (1986) , Teske (1995) ) were also used to verify that no major laws were omitted and to rank laws by historical significance. All telecommunications legislation was coded to identify historic laws, major laws, ordinary laws and minor ones. Major laws were identified in two ways: 1) by consensus of expert opinion, including Mayhew's (1992) list; 2) by coverage in Congressional Quarterly after 1945 (number of pages written about final passage of law). Prior to 1945, the length of the law (number of pages in the Statues at Large) was also considered, since more important laws tended to be of longer length.
The following definitions were used:
Historic (Super A): Nominated by consensus of expert judgment and by extensive coverage in CQ Almanac. The Communications Act of 1934 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 are both unanimously considered by policy experts in the field as the landmark legislative acts in telecommunications policy. The 1934 law created the FCC and the modern regulatory framework that was upheld by the Supreme Court even though it held delegated authority of Congress. The 1996 law changed the regulatory framework to support more competition and deregulation and had far-reaching effects into every area of telecommunications. (Its final coverage in CQ was 27 pages.)
Major (A/B):
Mayhew's Sweep One and Sweep Two public Laws (unless content of law was not primarily telecommunications), mentioned in either NYT or WP year-end Round-ups, nominated by 2 or more telecommunications policy experts, or laws having coverage greater or equal to 5 pages in CQ Almanac.
Ordinary (C) :
All other public laws mentioned in CQ Review, or with at least 1.5 pages of coverage in CQ Almanac, or nominated by at least one telecommunications policy expert listed above.
Minor (D):
All other public laws discussed in CQ Almanac (not just inclusion in the list, but some fraction of a page written about the law); prior to 1945, any law judged by the coder 17 to have at least some minor policy impact but not nominated by a policy expert.
Very minor (E):
Any other law identified by the list of laws but had no other reference by sources and no new policy impact. For instance a renewal of a "minor" law would be ranked "very minor."(Commemorative laws were excluded entirely.) Figure For purposes of analysis, several dependent variables are possible, e.g., raw counts of legislation by significance category per Congress, or the probability of a significant enactment per Congress. 18 In this chapter, we employ a somewhat different variable, a weighted scoring of laws based on Congressional Quarterly Almanac's coverage of enactments. More precisely, from the 81 st to 105 th Congresses, the dependent variable is the sum of Almanac's coverage of telecommunications enactments. For this time period, we regress the number of "Super A's," the number of "Other A or B's," and the number of "C's and D's" on the total coverage. This regression yields weights converting enactments in different categories into page coverage. 19 Then, we use the weights and the actual number of enactments in each significance category to create "expected CQ coverage" back to the beginning of the time series. Figure 1b shows the dependent variable, weighted laws, over time. The circles indicate each data point. The dotted line indicates the mean of the data (4.8 per congress). In general, the amount of Congressional lawmaking in the telecommunications area is rather low, reflecting a high degree of delegation to the FCC after 1934. However, there have been three bursts of policymaking activity : 1934, 1959-1971, and 1991-1997 .
Inter-Committee Proximity
Our discussion of "theory" suggested that the ideological distance between the relevant committees in the House and Senate would affect the volume of significant enactments. We implement this variable as the distance between the estimated ideal points of the chairmen of the Commerce Committees in each chamber, using the first dimension of Poole's common space NOMINATE scores. NOMINATE scores, based on a scaling of roll call votes in the floors of each chamber, are one of the most frequently used measures of congressmen's political ideology (Poole and Rosenthal) . Roughly speaking, 17 Grace R. Freedman investigated and coded all the legislation. 18 Most previous studies use the former, focusing on important laws (Adler et al, Coleman, Mayhew) . Binder uses the ratio of significant enactments to mentions of signficant bills in the New York Times. 19 The estimated regression is: CQ = -1.5 + 28.6 * SuperA + 5.7*OtherAB + .9CD, with respective t values of -.9, 5.8, 2.8, and 2.6, R 2 = .67, 21 degrees of freedom. Then, estimated CQ Coverage was taken to be: 25*SuperA + 5*OtherAB + .5CD -so the significance weights were in the ratio of 1:10:50.
the scores are bounded by -1 and 1, with negative scores being "liberal" and positive scores being "conservative." The common space scores use the movement of House members to the Senate to standardize the scaling across the two chambers, so that scores for House members and Senators are comparable. (If the distance lies below zero, the Senator chairing the Senate committee is more conservative than the Representative chairing the House committee.) As an aid to the analysis in the next section of the chapter, we standard this distance measure so that the closest chairs in the series receive a score of "1"and the most distant chairs in the series receive a proximity score of zero. 20 The standardized proximity score is shown in the bottom panel. The mean value of the standardized proximity score is .72.
Committee-Agency Distance
Our theoretical framework suggested that the distance between the responsible agency and the oversight committees might play an important role. We operationalize this variable in the following way. First, we identified all the commissioners of the Federal Radio Commission (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) and the FCC (post-1934) and the presidents who appointed them. As a proxy for the commissioners' own ideology, we used McCarty's pseudo-NOMINATE scores for the appointing president. 21 Then, we identified the ideology of the median commissioner. If the median commissioner lay outside the interval on the NOMINATE scale bounded by the House and Senate chairs, we calculated the distance between the median commissioner and the most proximate of the two committee chairs. In this case, the (absolute) distance became the variable. However, if the median commissioner lay within the interval, we scored the variable as zero. For the period before 1927, we proceeded in a similar way, but used the score imputed to the Secretary of Commerce (that is, McCarty's pseudo-NOMINATE score for the sitting president.) 22 Rather obviously, the likelihood of measure errors means that this measure needs to taken with a grain of salt -or perhaps a whole fistful! Nonetheless, we hope that large scores for the variable indicate that the preferred policies at the FCC are likely to be rather discordant with those favored by both committee chairs. Conversely, we hope that low scores indicate that the preferred policies at the FCC are not likely to be very discordant with those supported by both committee chairs. Figure 3 displays the data. The top panel displays the imputed position of the median FCC commissioner in NOMINATE space (or, prior to 1927, the 
The Production of Telecommunications Laws
Data Display Figure 4 displays the data, as a "first-cut" in revealing structure. The upper left hand panel is a scatter plot of weighted laws and inter-committee proximity. A highly flexible, non-parametric scatter plot smoother has been added, to help detect structure in the data. In some respects, the figure is promising. As theory led us to expect, the production of laws can be quite low even when inter-committee proximity is high. However, the only times production soars is when inter-committee proximity is high. And conversely, when inter-committee proximity is low, law production is low. Because proximity is only a necessary condition for production, the average relationship between proximity and production can be ambiguous, and the flatness of the scatter plot smoother shows that on average the actual relationship is quite weak.
The upper right hand panel examines the relationship between law production and agency distance. The data suggests a positive relationship, though not a dramatic one. However, the apparent relationship may be driven by a few influential data points.
The lower left hand panel examines the relationship between law production and the interaction of inter-committee proximity and agency distance. The interaction will take high values only when both variable take large values; it will be low when either or both are low. In light of the theoretical discussion, this is the critical scatter plot. Again, the data suggest a positive relationship, but not a dramatically strong one.
Finally, the lower right hand panel examines the relationship between inter-committee proximity and agency distance. On average, proximity takes its largest values when agency distance takes moderate values.
The initial cut in the data display is relatively promising. However, the bivariate scatter plots do not entirely capture the ideas discussed in Section 3. A better perspective is offered in Figure 5 . This figure examines the relationship between weighted laws and agency distance, controlling for the inter-committee proximity. In the figure, the lower left hand panel examines production and agency distance, at low levels of intercommittee proximity. Inter-committee proximity is greater in the lower right hand panel, greater still in the upper left hand panel, and high in the upper right hand panel.
In the first three panels, there appears to be a weak positive relationship between production and agency distance. But, in the upper right hand panel, where intercommittee proximity is great, the relationship becomes dramatically positive. In other words, when inter-committee proximity is extremely high, estrangement from the regulatory agency appears to lead to a burst of legislative production.
An interesting possibility is that creation of the FCC might dramatically alter the nature of legislative productivity in telecommunications possibility -the New Deal might mark a regime shift. If so, relationships might be quite different before 1935 and after. However, equivalent data displays (not shown) do not suggest at a regime shift. The relationships in the figures do not vary much, even if one breaks the data into two groups, pre-1935 and post-1935.
Statistical Models
Given the relationships uncovered in the data display, moving to statistical models seems justified -though the relative weakness of the relationships should temper expectations. Table 1 reports results from six simple linear regression models. Models 1 and 2 examine the relationship between legislative productivity, as measured by weighted laws, and inter-committee proximity and agency distance, respectively. Model 1 performs poorly: by itself, inter-committee proximity is a poor predictor of legislative productivity. In contrast, in Model 2, the tension between the oversight committee and the agency (as measured by agency distance) is a much better predictor of legislative productivity. The variable is statistically significant at the 1 percent level and is able to capture about 12% of the variance in legislative productivity.
Model 3 utilizes both variables, in additive form. This model performs far better, with both variables statistically significant at conventional levels. Together, they capture about 18% of the variance in the dependent variable. Model 4 adds the most beloved variable in the literature, unified party government. 24 The variable has the negative sign that principal-agent theory might lead one to expect, but it is not statistically significant at conventional levels. However, it does seem to add modestly to the model's fit. The model accounts for 20% of the variance in the dependent variable.
Model 5 examines the relationship between legislative productivity and the interaction of inter-committee proximity and agency distance. Both the theoretical discussion and the initial data display suggest that this is the key variable. As shown, the variable is highly statistically significant, at the .002 level. This one variable model is able to account for 19% of the variance in legislative productivity.
Model 6 adds the unified government variable to Model 5. Again, it is not statistically significant at conventional levels but it does seem to add modestly to the model's fit. This two variable model accounts for 21% of the variance in legislative productivity in telecommunications policy, over a time period of a century.
The regressions in Table 2 return to the possibility of a New Deal regime shift. The first two columns reproduce Models 5 and 6. Then, Models 7 and 8 are identical but run only on the data for 1899-1934. Models 9 and 10 are identical but run on the data for 1935-1998. Comparing Models 7 and 9, the coefficient on inter-committee proximity:agency distance increases by about 50% in the post-New Deal period, relative to the pre-New Deal period. Comparing Models 8 and 10, it increases by about onethird. In both cases, the models fit the post-New Deal period less well than in the preNew Deal period, perhaps suggesting greater volatility or the introduction of new sources of variation. But the difference in size of the key coefficient is not large relative to its standard error, so that the apparent difference may well be illusory. A Chow test affords a formal way to test for a regime change. Such a test finds no evidence of regime shift -the apparent change is entirely compatible with random variation. 25 We conclude that no regime shift took place. To the extent that the models work at all, they work equally well before and after the New Deal.
Predictions Figure 6 examines the predictions of the model against the historical record. (We use Model 6 for this purpose). The top panel shows actual observations (the points), and the model's predictions (the line). The lower panel shows the corresponding (standardized) residuals. Since the R 2 for this extremely simple model is only .21, it is not surprising to find recurrent discrepancies between the model and the data. However, the bottom panel identifies six egregious mistakes, which fall into three classes. First, the model predicts high levels of legislative production in the 73 rd , 102 nd , and 104 th Congresses, but not the monumental surges that actually occurred. In some sense, the model correctly identifies these periods as combining an "open window" and an ideological tension point. But, the model fails to account for the forces that pushed to take advantage of the moment so aggressively.
Second, the model fails to predict the surges that occurred in the 87 th and 90 th Congresses. In these Congresses, the House and Senate Commerce Committees were ideologically proximate, but the FCC was not particularly out of step with them. The dynamic driving these surges seems disconnected from the logic of model. Finally, the model predicts a legislative response (from a Republican Congress) to the very conservative Secretary of Commerce in the 56 th Congress. This failure suggests of degree of ahistoricity, or insensitivity to partisan connections.
Conclusion
Attempting to explain surges and slumps in legislative productivity over a century, with but one or two variables, is an audacious undertaking. From this perspective, the performance of the models is surprisingly good. For example, Model 5 does well at identifying particular moments of surge in law making. But its failure to identify all such moments, or discern mere surges from momentous explosions, is unsatisfactory. We believe a better explanatory apparatus must play greater attention to other dynamics in the regulatory regime -the pace of technological change, the force of new ideas like deregulation, and the power of new groups. Incorporating these factors into a coherent history of policymaking remains a difficult task for the future. Still, we have shown that simple ideas from modern institutional theory should play a role in any such history. 
